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Abstract
In this paper, we study challenges and possible solutions to cryptographic key management in mission-critical
networks. Existing symmetric key cryptography mechanisms do not scale well when supporting end-to-end secure
and private communication. Existing public key cryptography mechanisms in self-organized ad hoc networks
cannot resist a Sybil attack, where a single malicious node presents multiple identities to control a substantial
fraction of a network. In this paper, we present a new paradigm of public key cryptography based on combinatorial
design, called SMOCK, where nodes combine more than one key to encrypt and decrypt each message. Our key
allocation scheme guarantees that a set of keys held by one user is not a subset of keys held by any other user. We
show that our proposed method offers efficiency in memory usage, control data exchange, as well as controllable
resilience against node captures.
1 Introduction
There are emerging needs of collaboration in mission-critical applications, including battlefield communication,
emergency rescue operations, and disaster recovery. In such application scenarios, mobile nodes are dispatched into
incident areas and thus form Incident Area Networks (IANs) to handle incidents. These IAN form together a mission-
critical network and are established on demand and in ad hoc manner. It means that mobile nodes may leave one
IAN and join another one. Within the mission-critical network, inter-operability among organizations is necessary,
since different IANs may belong to different organizations. To facilitate inter-operability as well as protect security
and privacy, secure communication is in great demand. To safely exchange messages among legitimate users and
block unauthorized users from accessing network resources, we can deploy cryptographic keys to enforce secure
communications. However, the cryptographic key management is challenging due to following characteristics of the
mission critical networks:
• The number of ad hoc wireless devices deployed at an incident scene depends on specific nature of the incident.
Today, it is typically smaller than 1000, but may be larger in the future. Hence, key management for such a
network must be scalable.
• Besides link level security, privacy (end-to-end security) is a very important issue, and this is why end-to-end
secure channel is desired.
• More legitimated nodes may join the network later after some mission-critical nodes are deployed in the field.
• Nodes in mission-critical networks are mobile. Mobility introduces difficulties in trust management.
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1.1 Cryptographic Systems
Current solutions to key management in wireless ad hoc networks rely on two cryptographical algorithms: sym-
metric cryptography and public key cryptography. Symmetric key techniques are attractive due to their efficiency
in computation and power consumption. In symmetric key pre-distribution design for wireless sensor networks, our
goal is to use small amount of storage to achieve good secure connectivity and good resilience to node captures.
However, current design of key management for wireless sensor networks does not guarantee that each pair of nodes
share a unique secret key. Therefore, privacy of end-to-end secure communications cannot be preserved. In mission-
critical networks, privacy is an important issue. We assume that communications between two nodes must not be
overheard by any other node, even if the node is the insider of mission-critical network.
Recently, Elliptic Curve Cryptography (ECC) has been emerging as an attractive PKC scheme for mobile/wireless
environments [10] [9] [18]. In public key cryptography, any two nodes can establish a secure channel between
them without necessarily carrying pre-distributed keys. However, if nodes do not carry pre-distributed keys, one
or more trusted certificate authorities (CAs) are needed. Otherwise, the network cannot resist Sybil attacks [19],
where a single malicious node presents multiple identities to control a substantial fraction of the network, thereby
undermining the system performance. In mission-critical networks, authentication process by CAs is very costly in
terms of wireless communication overhead. Further, CAs may suffer from failures and attacks and stop functioning,
as a result, the whole network cannot operate smoothly.
Therefore, in mission-critical networks, we should issue public keys to all of the nodes beforehand. Although
operating in an ad hoc manner, mission-critical networks allow pre-distribution of security keys. Before being
dispatched to an incident area, nodes in the mission-critical network are able to communicate securely with trusted
authentication server in their domain center. However, once the nodes are dispersed to the field, authentication server
(domain) loses control of these nodes, and the nodes cannot trust each other without the protection of secure keys.
Figure 1 shows an example scenario of mission-critical networks.
Figure 1: Two authentication servers (police department and emergency medical service (EMS)) maintain the same
private and public key pool through a secure connection. Before deployment, their authentication servers pre-
distribute keys to devices. After devices are dispatched into the incident areas, it is costly and unsafe to communicate
with authentication servers. So all the devices authenticate messages according to the pre-distributed keys.
Since an authentication server is only available at network initialization phase and every time a node joins, it is
desired that nodes contact the authentication server in order to receive public key or a symmetric key, before joining
the network. Assume that network size is n. In order to build a secret communication channel between any pair of
nodes, a conventional key pre-distribution scheme requires each node to have n−1 keys. Moreover, each time a new
node joins the network, n− 1 distinct keys must be distributed respectively to n− 1 existing nodes. Hence, storage
requirement at each node and communication overhead for secret key distribution to a new node are both of O(n).
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1.2 Design Goal
We aim to design a method for cryptographic key management, which is scalable. Specifically, we require that
storage requirement at each node and communication overhead for key distribution to a new node are significantly
less than O(n). However, we allow computation requirement to be somewhat relaxed as long as processing delay
remains acceptable. Such relaxation is reasonable because the length of continuous use of a device carried by a first
responder is naturally constrained by the amount of time the first responder is able to spend in an incident scene
management operation, and the device may be recharged or have its battery replaced whenever the first responder is
recalled for duty rotation. Therefore, our design for a key management scheme needs to have following features:
1. Small overhead: The mission-critical networks are formed on demand and in ad hoc manner, and wireless link
capacity is limited. Communication overhead for authentication should be very small.
2. Fault tolerance: Mobile nodes in mission-critical network are prone to faults, so PKC protocols should be
tolerant to a fraction of node failures.
3. Resilience: Mobile wireless nodes are more vulnerable to various attacks due to the lack of physical protection
of wireless links. PKC protocols should operate securely even when a small amount of nodes is compromised.
4. Availability: Connectivity is not guaranteed in a mission-critical network. However, if any pair of nodes is
connected, secure communication should be available.
5. Small Footprint: Due to the limitation of memory on a mobile node, a small amount of memory should be
consumed to achieve (1), (2), (3) and (4).
1.3 Basic Idea
Our solution is inspired by the use of multiple keys to open a door to a vault. In SMOCK, a sender uses multiple
keys to encrypt a message and a receiver needs to use multiple keys to decrypt the message. We use public key
cryptography as follows: Each node possess a unique combination of private keys, and knows all the public keys.
The private key combination pattern is unambiguously associated with the node ID. Now if a sender A wants to send
a message to a receiver B, A will first acquire B’s ID to infer a set of private keys owned by B. Then A will encrypt
the message with the public key set that corresponds to private keys owned by B. The SMOCK scheme has been
verified to be very efficient and satisfy the overall design goals via simulation results.
1.4 Paper Organization
The paper is organized as follows: In Section 2, we summarize related work in key management. In Section 3, we
describe the background and problem description. Section 4 provides detailed key allocation algorithms. Section 5
illustrates how the proposed key management scheme resists against attacks. Section 6 gives detailed protocols for
secure communication and bootstrapping when new nodes are deployed. Section 7 assesses the proposed scheme.
Finally, Section 8 provides some concluding remarks.
2 Related Work
Symmetric key techniques have been proposed in [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] [7] [8]. The main advantage of sym-
metric key techniques is its computational and energy efficiency. In symmetric key techniques, secret keys are
pre-distributed among nodes before their deployment. A challenge of the secret key design is to use small memory
footprint to establish as many secure communication pairs as possible and achieve the highest level of resilience.
However, these techniques are not storage efficient for a large-scale network.
Eschenauer and Gligor propose a random key pre-distribution scheme [4] to address the storage limitation problem
of the symmetric key allocation. In the random key pre-distribution scheme, each node selects a subset of random
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keys from a pool of keys before deployment. The probability that any pair of nodes possesses at least one common
key is p, thus with p probability two nodes can share secret.
To increase resilience of a network against node capture, Chan, Perrig and Song extend the random key pre-
distribution scheme to use q−composite keys to establish a secure link [2], where q (q > 1) common keys are
needed instead of just one. In random key scheme, two immediate neighbors are connected by a secure link with
probability p, and there is always a chance that the graph may not be fully connected, and the chances are increasing
as q increases. While detecting the disconnection, the network can increase transmission range by increasing trans-
mission power, and thus introduce more interference. Another limitation of random key schemes is communication
overhead during key set up phase after deployment.
In a master key based protocol [11] by Lai, Kim and Verbauwhede, a single master key is pre-distributed to all
nodes in a network. A pair of nodes use the master key to establish a session key. Each node uses one unit of memory
to store the master key, and it is very memory efficient. However, resilience of the master key scheme is poor since
once the master key is disclosed, all links are compromised.
Camtepe and Yener propose a combinatorial design of key distribution of symmetric keys [1], where m is a design
parameter. The scheme supports (m2 +m+ 1) nodes in the network and the key-pool size is (m2 +m+ 1). Each
node carries m+1 keys and every pair of nodes has exactly one key in common. Therefore, communications among
network nodes are secure. When one node is captured, with the probability of 1m , a link in the network will be
compromised. The limitation of this scheme is that it does not apply to arbitrary number of nodes in the network.
In both random key pre-distribution and combinatorial design scheme, a key is shared by several nodes. Thus the
communication of any pair of nodes may be overheard by some other nodes which hold the same key. Therefore,
privacy cannot be preserved under such mechanisms. In mission-critical networks, privacy is crucial as well.
PKC approaches were originally targeted at the Internet [12]. In order to tailor PKC approaches to ad hoc net-
works, Zhou and Haas propose a distributed public-key management scheme for ad hoc networks [13], where mul-
tiple distributed certificate authorities are used. To sign a certificate, each authority generates a partial signature for
the certificate and submits the partial signature to a coordinator that calculates the signature from the partial signa-
tures. Kong et al. describe a fully distributed scheme [14], where every node carries a share of the private key of
the service. This scheme increases availability of authentication. But on the other hand, it increases communication
overhead for authentication. [10] shows that it is practical to use PKC for sensor networks, where computational
power of each device is low. Capkun, Buttyan, and Hubaux propose a self-organized public key management sys-
tem [15], where users issue certificates based on their personal acquaintances. Each user maintains a local certificate
repository. When two users want to verify the public keys of each other, they merge their local certificate repositories
and try to find (within the merged repository) appropriate certificate chains that make the verification possible.
Montenegro and Castelluccia propose a scheme to bind node IDs to public keys in [16], where the public key is
hashed, and the hash value is used as part of the IP address of the node. Therefore, the certificates to bind the node
ID to its public key is not necessary.
In summary, the PKC mechanisms are usually memory efficient and can achieve excellent resilience, however,
they are vulnerable to Sybil attacks. In this paper, we utilize the combinatorial design of PKC to achieve secure
communication and protect privacy between each pair of nodes.
3 Problem Definition
Assume a group of people who want to exchange correspondence securely between each pair of them. There is
a set of public keys available to all. But each person keeps a different subset of private keys. The key pool of such
a system K consists of a set of private-public key pairs. Each key pair consists of two mathematical related keys.
Let KprivAlice denote a subset of private keys held by Alice, and KpubAlice represent the corresponding public key subset.
If Bob wants to send his secret message to Alice, he needs to know KpubAlice, where KprivAlice 6⊂ Kprivanybody else. Bob is
able to pass the secret message to Alice, using the public keys KpubAlice to encrypt message. The message can only be
opened by Alice, who has the private key set KprivAlice, but others do not. In this scenario, we know that
• For a public/private key pair, multiple copies of the private key can be held by different users.
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• Each person keeps a predetermined subset of private keys, and no one else has all the private keys in that
subset.
• A message is encrypted by a subset of public keys. The message can only be read when the message can be
decrypted by the subset of private keys corresponding to the subset of public keys.
Symbols and terms used throughout this paper are shown as in Table 1.
Table 1: Notations and Symbols
K A Key pool: a set of public-private key pairs
privateKeyij j-th private key hold by user i, j ∈ [1, bi]
publicKeyij j-th public key hold by user i, j ∈ [1, bi]
Kprivi A set of private keys held by user i, Kprivi = {privateKeyij |∀j}
Kpubi A set of public keys corresponding to Kprivi
Ki A set of public-private key pairs held by user i,
Ki = {(kpriv, kpub)| kpriv ∈ Kprivi & corresponding kpub ∈ Kpubi }
M Memory size for key storage
kc(x) Expected number of disclosed keys when x nodes are captured
kv(x) Maximum number of disclosed keys when x nodes are captured
Vx(a, b) Vulnerability metrics as x nodes are captured.
C(a, b) Abbreviation of
(
a
b
)
V A set of nodes in the ad hoc wireless network
n Total number of nodes in the network, n = |V |
3.1 Definitions
Definition 1: A public-private key pair is defined as (kpub, kpriv). The symbol Kprivv stands for a set of private
keys held by node v. Then the key pool K = {(kpub, kpriv)|kpriv ∈ Kprivv ,∀v ∈ V }. a = |K| represents the number
of distinct keys.
Definition 2: A key allocation KA: 2K → V , maps the key pairs in K to a set of nodes in V , so that v ∈ V is
assigned a subset of key pairs Ki (Ki ⊂ K)). To guarantee the secure communication between each pair of nodes i
and j, we have ∀i ∀j Ki 6⊆Kj (the same as Kprivi 6⊆Kprivj ) and Kj 6⊆Ki (the same as Kprivj 6⊆Kprivi ), iff i 6= j. If this
property holds, the key allocation is valid.
Definition 3: We say that a key allocation is isometric, if |K1| = |K2| = · · · = |Kn| = b; otherwise, the key
allocation is non-isometric.
Definition 4: We say that the key assignment to user i, Ki and the key assignment to user j, Kj conflict, if either
Ki⊆Kj or Kj⊆Ki. For a valid key allocation, there does not exist conflicting key assignments for any pair of the
users.
3.2 Objectives
To guarantee the secure communication between n people, we need to have enough public-private key pairs.
On the other hand, similar to a vault system, we want to use a small number of locks and distribute a small number
copies of keys to each person for efficient key management. Generally, we desire the key management to be memory
efficient for key storage, communication efficient during authentication, computationally efficient during encryption
and decryption, and resilient under node captures. Therefore, we define multiple objectives of the key allocation
mechanism as:
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Objective 1 Memory Efficiency Given a network of size n, we need to find a key pool K and a key allocation KA
to achieve {
min |K|+max
i∈V
bi
s.t. Ki 6⊆Kj and Ki 6⊇Kj ∀i 6= j
(1)
where bi = |Ki| = |Kprivi | is the total number of private keys stored at node i. |K| = a is the total number of public
keys need to be stored. Note each node stores all the public keys before deployment, but only store a small subset or
private keys Kprivi for user i. If a user is assigned a key pair (kpub, kpriv), then the user holds the private key kpriv.
Therefore, |K| + bi is the number of memory slots at node i to store the public keys and private keys for secure
communications.
Objective 2 Computational Complexity To simplify security operation, each person wants to use a small number
of public keys to encrypt the outgoing messages, and a small number of private keys to decrypt incoming messages.
Therefore, we have the following objective{
min max
i∈V
bi
s.t. Ki 6⊆Kj and Ki 6⊇Kj ∀i 6= j
(2)
Objective 3 Resilience Requirement Under isometric key allocation scheme, we denote a vulnerability metric by
Vx(a, b), which is the percentage of communications being compromised when x nodes are captured. To achieve
desired resilience under capture of x nodes, we define
Vx(a, b) =
C(kc(x), b)
C(a, b)
≤ P (3)
where P is the resilience bound representing the upper-bound of the compromised communications when x nodes
are randomly captured, each with equal likelihood.
In SMOCK, each user needs only to carry b private keys and a public keys, wherein (a + b) << n. The price to
pay for our scheme is controllable compromise in resiliency against node captures. Clearly if a node is captured, all
its keys are compromised, regardless of the number of private keys it carries. However, in our scheme, the capture
of x nodes compromises C(kc(x), b) distinct key-sets on the average, and up to C(kv(x), b) distinct key-sets in the
worst case. It follows that the vulnerability metric, Vx(a, b) is C(bkc(x)c, b)C(a,b) on the average or
C(kv(x), b)
C(a,b) in the worst
case. Clearly, C(kc(x), b) and C(kv(x), b) do not compare favorably with x. But, by increasing the value of a,
we can make C(a, b) >> n, therefore, make Vx(a, b) compare favorably with x/n, which we refer as benchmark
resilience.
4 Key Allocation Algorithm
Our key management scheme, SMOCK, will use the isometric key allocation algorithms to achieve the objectives
outlined in Section 3.2. The reason is that the isometric scheme achieves better performance than non-isometric
allocations as shown in Appendix (see Proposition 3). In this section we show: (1) Under isometric key allocation,
determine the size of key pool a and b; (2) Allocate distinct private key sets to users to build secure channel between
each pair of users. We first specify heuristic algorithms to obtain a near optimum key allocation solution in terms of
both Objective 1 and Objective 2. We then make some adjustment to the solution to satisfy the resilience requirement
in Objective 3.
4.1 Derivation of a and b
4.1.1 Optimization of design objectives
Value b affects the complexity of encryption and decryption. Therefore, we’d like to relax a to allow b to be small.
The extreme case is that a = n and b = 1, where each person keeps a key and every key only has a single copy. The
following algorithm helps to determine a and b to achieve the design objectives. Assume the network size is n.
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Objective 1 requires an to be small for key storage efficiency. Meanwhile Objective 3 requires ab to be large for
good resilience. Therefore, there are two conflicting objectives. Algorithm 1 trades off between memory efficiency
and good resilience.
Algorithm 1:
(1) Initialize l = 2.
While (C(l, b l2c) < n)
do {l = l + 1};
a = l, b = b l2c;
(2) While (C(a, b− 1) > n)
do {b = b− 1};
(3) While (C(a+ 1, b− 1) > n)
do {a = a+ 1, b = b− 1};
(4) While (Equation (3) is not satisfied)
do {
if(C(a+ 1, b− 1) > n)
{a = a+ 1, b = b− 1}
else
{a = a+ 1}
}
(5) |K| = a and |Ki| = b.
Step (1) of Algorithm 1 calculates the minimum number of memory slots to store public keys in order to support
the secure communication among n nodes. Step (2) minimizes Objective 1. Step (3) further optimizes the Objective
2 while keeping Objective 1 unchanged. Step (4) ensures that the key allocation meet Objective 3. If the resulting
a and b do not satisfy the resilience requirement specified by Objective 3, we either increase a, or simultaneously
increase a and decrease b. Thus an is increased by
1
n and
a
b is increased by
1
b or
b+1
b(b−1) . For n >> b, it is a reasonable
trade-off of memory slots to achieve better resilience.
4.1.2 Meeting key storage constraint
Total memory slots for key storage is often limited to M , where M is large enough to support n nodes. In this
case, we should fully utilize the memory slots to optimize Objective 2 and achieve the best resilience given by the
left hand side of Objective 3. Thus, we come up with Algorithm 2.
Algorithm 2:
(1) Let a = d2M3 e, b = bM3 c ;
(2) While (C(a+ 1, b− 1) > n)
do {a = a+ 1, b = b− 1};
(3) Then |K| = a and |Ki| = b.
4.2 Key Allocation
For a given network size n, we have determine a and b. Then, we randomly assign b private keys to each node. A
single key should be assigned to at most baC(a, b) nodes; otherwise, we cannot get a valid key allocation. The key
assignment should make Ki 6⊆Kj and Ki 6⊇Kj , so that the key allocation described above can support the pair-wise
secure communication for a network of size C(a, b). Note that for a very large network size, if we do not consider
the resilience requirement, a and b can be very small. E.g., a = 20, b = 4, the network size can be as large as 4845.
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5 Resistance Against Attacks
5.1 Against Eavesdropping
Eavesdropping is a passive attack, where an unauthorized recipient intercepts the message. To prevent eaves-
dropping and protect privacy, when a node vi sends a message Mij to vj , the node first truncates Mij into b pieces,
Mij(1),Mij(2), · · · ,Mij(b) and encrypts the message as follows:
Sij1 = E(publicKeyj1, Mij(1))
Sij2 = E(publicKeyj2, Mij(2)⊕Mij(1))
· · ·
Sijb = E(publicKeyjb, Mij(b)⊕Mij(b− 1))
(4)
Since a receiver vj knows the private keys in Kprivj , vi can decrypt the message as follows:
Mij(1) = D(privateKeyj1, Sij1)
Mij(2) = D(privateKeyj2, Sij2)⊕Mij(1)
· · ·
Mij(b) = D(privateKeyjb, Sijb)⊕Mij(b− 1)
(5)
5.2 Avoid Spoofing
If node vi sends a message and wishes to assure the receiver that nobody fakes the message or the sender’s ID, it
encrypts the message as follows:
Sij1 = E(privateKeyi1, Mij(1))
Sij2 = E(privateKeyi2, Mij(2)⊕Mij(1))
· · ·
Sijb = E(privateKeyib, Mij(b)⊕Mij(b− 1))
(6)
At the receiver side, node vj recovers the message as follows:
Mij(1) = D(publicKeyi1, Sij1)
Mij(2) = D(publicKeyi2, Sij2)⊕Mij(1)
· · ·
Mij(b) = D(publicKeyib, Sijb)⊕Mij(b− 1)
(7)
5.3 Prevent DoS Attack
A malicious node or an inattentive node from outside of the mission-critical network can launch DoS attack on
data traffic by injecting a significant amount of data traffic into the network to clog the network. Without protection
mechanism, legitimate user packets will be dropped along with malicious ones as the result of congestion. In this
case, signature of a legitimate sender is required for routing request message. In traditional public key cryptography
(PKC), a node in the self-organizing network may not possess the public key of the sender, thus need communicate
with its neighbors to verify the signature of the sender. In the SMOCK framework, since the key pool is usually
small, each intermediate node keeps all the public keys locally, thus can easily check whether the signature from a
sender is correct alone.
5.4 Facilitate Anonymous Routing
It is straightforward for SMOCK to render anonymous routing very convenient. For example, if a sender knows all
intermediate nodes on a route to a destination, it has an option to encrypt all packet headers so that each intermediate
node can only learn about its next hop, but not other nodes on the route.
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5.5 Resist Sybil Attack
With pre-distributed keys, a malicious node cannot initiate a Sybil attack, since the user cannot circulate fake keys
in the network. Secure communication requires proper keys from both sender and receiver, while all the public keys
are known by each of the users. Since the total number of public keys is small, it is feasible for each user to carry
all of them. In our scheme, secure communication is not based on secure key exchanging. Therefore, the attacker
cannot circulate fake keys to launch a Sybil attack.
6 Secure Communication Protocols
In this section we specify detailed protocols used for initialization, communication, and bootstrapping. The
initialization phase is performed before deployment. Since communication and bootstrapping are on-line procedures.
They have to be very efficient in terms of communication overhead (using a small number of messages).
6.1 Initialization
The initialization phase is to assign keys and identifications to each node. The algorithms for key allocation
are shown in Section 4. A node’s identification (ID) represents a subset of keys the node possesses. In future
communication, if two nodes want to exchange secure message, each needs to know the ID of the other. From the
ID, a node can tell which private keys the other has, and it can encrypt the message by the corresponding public
keys. Node IDs do not have to form a contiguous range. After key allocation, each node knows the private keys
assigned to it, and all the public keys. We label the keys by numbers 0, 1, 2 · · ·. Let keyIDj
i
be the i-th private key
held by node j. Let a be the total number of public keys and b be the number of private keys kept at each node. For
each node j, we have keyIDj1 > keyID
j
2 > · · · > keyIDjb . The ID field spans b×dlog2 ae bits as shown in Figure
2(a). Each keyIDj
i
takes dlog2 ae bits. It is easy to show that the node ID is unique as long as each node is assigned
a unique subset of private keys.
2
jkeyID1
jkeyID jbkeyID...
(a) ID field of node j
BobAlice
1: ID Request
2: ID of Bob
3: EncMsg to Bob
(b) Secure communication between Alice and Bob
Figure 2: Secure communication protocols
6.2 Secure Communication
Figure 2(b) shows a procedure of secure communication between Alice and Bob, where Alice and Bob establish
a secure communication channel from Alice to Bob. If Alice already knows Bob’s ID, she can send an encrypted
message (EncMsg) directly to Bob. Otherwise, she needs to send a ID request message to Bob, and Bob replies with
his ID. After Alice receives Bob’s ID, she can figure out which public keys Bob is associated with, and she encrypts
the message correspondingly before she sends the message.
Since Bob holds a unique subset of private keys, only he is able to decrypt the message correctly. Note that,
Bob’s ID can be transmitted by plain text, and any malicious user who steals Bob’s ID cannot decrypt the encrypted
message.
6.3 Bootstrapping to Accommodate New Nodes
Assume that a previously deployed network contains a public keys and each user possesses b private keys. Sup-
pose we desire to deploy more nodes in the field. If the total number of deployed nodes (including previously
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deployed nodes and new nodes) is smaller than C(a, b), then no bootstrapping is necessary. The newly deployed
nodes can choose unused combinations of private keys from the existing key pool.
If network size is larger than C(a, b) after incremental deployment, then the system needs to generate more key
pairs, say a′ new key pairs, and assign b private keys to the additional nodes before their deployment, where b private
keys must include at least one key from the newly created key pairs. This implies that bootstrapping information for
additional nodes must be present. We fix the number of private keys possessed by each node. After new nodes join
the network, they need to broadcast the newly generated public keys and the number a′ to those previous deployed
nodes. Each node in the network only needs to broadcast one such bootstrapping message.
It can be verified that, given C(a, b), the increment of a by 1 brings C(a, b− 1) new valid key sets for new nodes.
Therefore, with a′ new key pairs, the network is able to accommodate
a′−1∑
i=0
C(a + i, b − 1) new nodes. Note that
keeping b unchanged and increasing a doesn’t violate the resilience bound P given in Objective 3.
To prevent unauthorized nodes from establishing communication channels with legitimate nodes and thus gain
entry into the network, bootstrapping information should be encrypted. Since the number of previously deployed
nodes is smaller than C(a, b), there must exist at least one newly deployed node that can choose all its b private keys
from the existing a key pairs. Therefore this node should initiate the broadcasting of the newly added a′ public keys
and encrypt the message by its private keys according to section 5.2. When the previous deployed nodes receive
such information, they encrypt the information by their private keys and broadcast it to their neighbors. Since all
nodes know the previously generated public keys, such message will be verified and forwarded. Therefore, the
whole network will be aware that some new legitimate nodes are joining the network, and new public keys are
generated. The resulting total number of key pairs in the network is a + a′ and the ID field takes a larger size as
b× dlog2(a+ a′)e. Each network node should reconfigure its ID as shown in section 6.1.
7 Evaluations
7.1 Small Memory Footprint
In SMOCK, a few key pairs can support secure communication of a very large network. According to the Algo-
rithm 1 in section 4.1, 18 key pairs in the network can support end-to-end secure communication among 1000 nodes
without resilience consideration. In Figure 3(a), we show the minimum number of keys needed at each node for
typical mission-critical network sizes. Therefore, we can achieve very small memory footprint under the SMOCK
scheme.
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Figure 3: The minimal number of keys needed
A total of a public keys can support at most C(a, ba2c) nodes in the network. By Stirling’s Approximation, n! ≈√
(2n+ 13)pi n
ne−n. Hence, a public keys can support a network of size Θ( 2a√
a
), where 2a is dominant as n turns
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very large. Accordingly, the total number of key pairs required is at a level of Θ(log2 n) = Θ( 1lg 2 lg n) = Θ(lgn),
which can be verified by Figure 3(b). We conclude that the SMOCK yields very small memory footprint.
If we relax the storage limitation, the number of private keys needed decreases, and computational complexity
is reduced accordingly. Figure 4 shows the trade-off between computational complexity and key storage space for
different network scales, where the computational complexity is inferred by the number of private keys needed.
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Figure 4: Trade-off between storage space and computational complexity
7.2 Communication Overhead
It is not necessary for SMOCK to perform key setup or verification in the field. Therefore, SMOCK has virtually
no overhead for authentication after the deployment.
7.3 Resilience to Node Failure
The proposed scheme is able to tolerate a fraction of node failures. Node failures in a network do not affect the
secure communication between any other pair of nodes as long as the network remains connected, since each node
keeps its secret keys for communication locally.
7.4 Resilience to Node Capture
7.4.1 Average case analysis
Capture of any single node by an adversary does not release enough information to the adversary to break secure
communication for any pair of nodes. However, capture of multiple nodes may compromise a set of other nodes.
Assume x nodes are captured and kc(x) is the expected number of keys disclosed if x nodes are captured. As Lemma
3 in Appendix shows, kc(x) = a−(a−b)
(
(a−b)
a
)x−1
. Then C(kc(x), b)C(a,b) percentage of the node will be compromised.
Let’s assume n = 1000, Figure 5(a) shows the average case percentage of compromised nodes when a small portion
of nodes are captured.
7.4.2 Worst case analysis
For mission-critical applications, it may be important to consider resilience against the worst case where each
newly captured node releases b new keys to the adversary. If we define kv(x) as the number of keys disclosed by
the capture of x nodes, then in the worst case, kv(x) = min(xb, a), where a is the total number of key pairs and
b is the number of private keys kept by each node. In the worst case, we want to calculate the probability that
an allocated key set is compromised as Prob(a key set is compromised | the key set is allocated). Since the
events “a key set is compromised” and “a key set is allocated” are independent, then the worst case probability
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Figure 5: The percentage of compromised nodes with the node capture
is Prob(a key set is compromised). Therefore, given a and b, in worst case, the capture of x nodes results in
C(kv(x), b)
C(a,b) percent of the communication compromises, where n is the network size. Figure 5(b) shows the worst
case percentage of the compromised nodes, where we can see that the capture of dab e nodes can compromise the
whole network in the worst case. However, the capture of d a2be nodes only compromise a small ratio of the network.
7.4.3 Control resilience
As long as the number of key pairs is large enough, the percentage of the compromised nodes will be small enough
when a certain number of nodes is compromised. This is the practical reason that we want to choose a somewhat
larger value for a, the total number of key pairs used in the network. Figure 5 shows that capture of any single
node cannot compromise any other node in the network, and capture of multiple nodes may disclose information to
the adversary to compromise more than the number of captured nodes. The capture of multiple nodes will be more
expensive for the adversary than the capture of a single node. On the other hand, whenever the network detects the
compromise of a user, it is necessary to nip it in the bud by dynamically revoking and redistributing new keys. 1
Consider the resilience requirement as: C(kc(20), b)C(a,b) < 20%. When 20 or fewer nodes are captured, we require that at
most 20% of the secure channels are compromised. According to Algorithm 1, the minimum memory slots needed
to fulfill such resilience requirement is 70.
Figure 6 compares the total number of keys needed to achieve Vx(a, b) < x/n under SMOCK with the conven-
tional public key scheme. We assume that only a small subset of nodes may be captured. Figure 6(a) and Figure
6(b) show that when SMOCK achieves benchmark resilience at x = 20, it performs better resilience for x ≤ 20,
but requires smaller memory size, comparing with conventional scheme. Figure 6(c) shows the total number of keys
required to be stored at each node in order to achieve benchmark resilience when x goes up until x = 100. For
applications with a high resilience requirement, we recommend using x/n as the resilience bound in Objective 3.
7.5 Ability to Expand Network
The protocol describing the bootstrapping procedure when new nodes are deployed to an existing network is
specified in section 6.3. New nodes should let the previously deployed nodes know their public keys. Since a small
number of keys can support a large network size, the communication overhead for broadcasting the public keys
during bootstrapping is moderate. On the other hand, since at least one newly deployed node chooses all its private
keys from the known key pairs of the existing network, it can encrypt and broadcast the newly generated public keys
by its own signature. Thus the network has the ability to distinguish between legitimate nodes and malicious nodes
which try to gain access to the network.
1The node capture detection and key revocation is beyond the scope of this paper.
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Figure 6: Comparison of SMOCK which achieves benchmark resilience and conventional public key scheme for
(n = 1000)
8 Concluding Remarks
We propose a key predistribution scheme, which requires significantly less than O(n) key storage overhead and
communication overhead in an wireless ad hoc network with n nodes. The scheme also achieves controllable re-
silience against node captures. The characteristics of mission-critical networks imply that the proposed scheme is
promising in the following aspects.
• Scalability and the ability to dynamically deploy additional nodes.
• Resistance against malicious nodes, who pretend to be legitimate nodes (Sybil Attack)
• Resilience to node capture. By our analysis, in order to get better resilience, b cannot be large. Usually b is an
integer between 2 to 4.
• Protection of communication privacy (end-to-end security), such that the talk between any pair of nodes
doesn’t disclose secret to other nodes.
We further address the following issues to conclude our paper.
8.1 Computational Complexity
In SMOCK, the computational complexity is b times that of a widely known traditional PKC mechanism. How-
ever, if we use Diffie-Hellman protocol on top of SMOCK to establish session keys, as well as caching of the session
keys, we can further reduce the computational overhead. As explained in Section 1.2, for key management in a
mission-critical ad hoc wireless network, it is reasonable for computation requirement to be somewhat relaxed as
long as processing delay remains acceptable. Furthermore, the idea of using non-symmetric keys to trigger symmet-
ric keys excludes the computational complexity as a major concern in our design.
8.2 Key Length in SMOCK
In this paper, we have discussed the needed storage space in terms of the number of keys. Strictly speaking, we
should also take into consideration the size of keys used in different cryptography techniques for fair evaluation of
SMOCK. Given n nodes, the storage required in a conventional symmetric key technique is ηsn, where ηs denotes
length of a symmetric key. On the other hand, SMOCK, requires each node to carry a public keys and b private keys,
such that the total storage required is (ηaa + ηbb) (in most cases ηa = ηb = η). To demonstrate an advantage of
SMOCK over conventional techniques, we need to show not only a+ b << n, but also η(a+ b) << ηsn.
[20] illustrates the information regarding symmetric and RSA asymmetric key lengths with similar resistance
to brute force attacks. Accordingly, to achieve equivalent level of security, we should select much longer RSA
asymmetric keys than symmetric keys. However, [21] [22] show that Elliptic Curve Cryptography (ECC) can
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offer equivalent security with substantially smaller key sizes. For example, key size of 160 bits in ECC achieves
equivalent security to 80 bit symmetric key scheme and 1024 bit RSA, and 521 bit ECC is equivalent to 256 bit
symmetric key scheme and 15360 bitRSA. With roughly η = 2ηs underECC algorithm, we have η(a+b) << ηsn.
Therefore, we conclude that SMOCK achieves an excellent memory efficiency.
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APPENDIX
Lemma 1: In a valid non-isometric key allocation KA, if node i is assigned the smallest key pair set, and node v
is assigned the largest key pair set, then there exists a valid key allocation to increase bi by 1 with bv unchanged.
Proof For any other node j, we have bj ≥ bi, since node i is assigned the smallest key set. If for all j (i 6=
j and j ∈ V ), bj > bi, then we can get a valid key allocation KA′ by adding any key pair to user i. Since in the new
key allocation KA′, Ki 6⊆Kj must hold, if it holds in KA. In KA′, Kj 6⊆Ki must hold also, otherwise, Kj = Ki in
KA′, which implies Ki ⊂ Kj in KA, thus it contradicts the fact that KA is a valid key allocation. Therefore, in this
case, we can get a new key allocation KA′, which increases bi by 1, and keeps bj unchanged.
If there exist a set J , where j 6= i, and bj = bi, then we will show how to increase bi by 1, and still get a valid
key allocation KA′. If there exists a key pair, adding which to Ki does not cause key assignment conflicting with
i and any j ∈ J , then we can get valid key allocation KA′ and increase bi by 1. If we cannot find such a key pair,
then we have K′i by adding any key pair to Ki, and can always find j ∈ J and Kj ⊂ K′i. In this case, we can replace
the original Kj with K′i, and keep the original Ki. Such replacement is equivalent to adding a new key pair to Kj’s.
So far, the key allocation is invalid since Ki still contradicts with a Kj , j ∈ J . We can create (a− bi − 1) potential
assignment options by adding one key pair to each Kj , j ∈ J . Among all these options, we have totally ∑a−bi−1k=1 k
distinct new key assignment options, since any two users create a common key assignment option. We have at most
a − bi replacements of Kj . Since ∑a−bi−1k=1 k > a − bi, so after a − bi replacement, we still can find an option to
replace the original Ki and create a valid key allocation. Thus, bi and (a − bi) of bj , j ∈ J increase by 1. So we
find a way to increase bi by one, but keep bv unchanged.
Proposition 1: Given K and a valid non-isometric key allocation KA, we can always find a new valid isometric
key allocation KA′, so that we can further optimize both Objective 1 and Objective 2 or make the values of objective
functions remain the same.
Proof First, we sort the nodes (users) in the increasing order of the number of keys owned by users, so that node 1
keeps the least keys and node n keeps the most keys. If node i keeps a set of keys Ki = {ki1, ki2, · · · , kibi}, then the
number of keys kept by node i is denoted as |Ki| = bi. We have b1 ≤ b2 ≤ · · · ≤ bn. For a valid non-isometric key
allocation, there must exist t that bt−1 < bt. Choose the smallest t. By Lemma 1, there exists a valid key allocation
to increase bt−1 by 1. The increment on bt−1 opens up several possible key assignment options for user l, where
bl > bt. If there does not exist such l, then the increment on bt−1 by 1 doesn’t increase the value of Objective 1
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and Objective 2. If there exists such l, we know bl > bt, then we have chance to further optimize Objective 1 and
Objective 2 by making bl = bt.
We can keep doing the above step until we get the isometric key allocation KA′. We know that KA′ is valid, and
Objective 1 and Objective 2 either get smaller or remain the same when comparing to the original non-isometric key
assignment KA.
Lemma 2: Given a set of key pairs K, wherein |K| = a. The network size is n. Therefore, we need at least n key
sets. If C(a, b) < n ≤ C(a, b + 1), for b < ba2c − 1, an isometric allocation utilizing only key sets of a fixed size
b+ 1 minimizes Objective 2 and hence Objective 1 among all of the isometric allocations.
Proof For isometric key allocation, the proof is based on the following fact that for a ≥ b ≥ 1, C(a, b) is increas-
ing as 1 ≤ b ≤ ba2c. Otherwise, C(a, b) is decreasing as ba2c ≤ b ≤ a. When a is odd, C(a, ba2c) = C(a, da2e).
Proposition 2: Given a and u ≤ ba2c, then there exists an isometric key allocation to support n = C(a, u) nodes,
and each of the node is assigned a key set of length u. For other key allocations to support n nodes, the maximum
length of assigned key set is larger than u.
Proof Given a, we define Group b to be a set of all C(a, b) key sets of size b. When n = C(a, u), the isometric
allocation using all key sets in Group u is optimal in accordance with Lemma 2. For any other allocations, at least
one key set is selected from higher groups or lower groups. Without using key set from higher groups, it is not
possible to replace a key sets in group u with one from lower groups, since any key set from those groups will be a
subset of at least one key set in group u.
Also we can conclude that given a, when n > C(a, ba2c), there exists no valid allocation for n nodes.
Proposition 3: Isometric allocation of keys performs better than non-isometric allocation.
Proof Proposition 3 is intuitive, based on proposition 1 and proposition 2.
Given any non-isometric key allocation, there exists an isometric key allocation which achieves the same or
smaller value in terms of Objective 1 and Objective 2. On the other hand, given a, by isometric key allocation, there
doesn’t exist a valid non-isometric key allocation yielding better or equal value in terms of Objective 1 and Objective
2.
Lemma 3: Assume the number of key pairs used by the network is a, and each node possesses b private keys. If x
nodes are captured, then kx = a− (a− b)
(
(a−b)
a
)x−1
expected number of keys will be disclosed. Then C(bkc(x)c, b)C(a,b)
percentage of the node will be compromised.
Proof: Assume no bias when nodes choose private keys from the key pool. When the first node is captured, b
keys are disclosed and kc(1) = b. If the i-th node is captured, b × a−kc(i−1)a new keys will be revealed. When i-th
node is captured, totally kc(i) keys are disclosed:
kc(i) = kc(i− 1) + b× a− kc(i− 1)
a
(8)
Equation (8) implies kc(i) = a−ba kc(i − 1) + b, where kc(1) = b. Let yi = kc(i) − a. Replace the kc(i) with
yi + a, then yi = a−ba yi−1 and y1 = b − a. We get yi =
(
a−b
a
)i−1
y1. Therefore, ki = a − (a − b)
(
a−b
a
)i−1
. If
all a node picks up all its b keys from the set of disclosed keys, then the node is compromised. The total number of
such nodes is C(bkc(x)c, b), and the total number of possible choices of key selection is C(a, b). The percentage is
thus obtained.
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